

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events



1918 - 1950

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION • INCORPORATED • 22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIX No. 36

JUNE 30, 1950

Invasion Climaxes Problems of South Korea

(The fighting that started in Korea on June 24 and the "cease-fire" order issued by the United Nations Security Council on June 25 give added interest to the article below, prepared before these events had occurred.—Editor)

The visit paid to South Korea on June 17 by John Foster Dulles, Republican adviser to the Department of State, focused attention anew on Korean prospects following the May 30 elections.

It is a tribute to the potentialities of democratic procedures that the Korean elections of 1948 (the first in some 4,000 years of history) and those just held should have brought out so large a percentage of the total electorate. Over 95 per cent turned out for the 1948 elections, and despite Communist threats of attack on the polling places, despite disturbances, economic unrest and some disillusionment, about 86 per cent cast their votes in the May election. Most of the candidates elected were so-called "independents." This does not mean that they represent a party by that name but that they express, with regard to the two major parties, a feeling on the part of the majority of the people of "a plague on both your houses."

Korea's Many Problems

The election results have been interpreted by some observers as a direct rebuke to the President, Dr. Syngman Rhee, and a threat to his power. This is not entirely true. Dr. Rhee's name is still one to conjure with as far as the majority of South Koreans are concerned. The election of the new and literally "independent" members of the Assembly will, however, give Dr. Rhee reason to "think deeply" (a Korean phrase) on some topics. His attempts to

strengthen the cabinet by the appointment of men who command national respect and his implementation of the new land law and other reforms are probably due not merely to suggestions by American advisers and diplomats. They doubtless indicate that Dr. Rhee, who is a keen observer of his people, has sensed something of the popular feeling. A letter received from Korea early in June says "the level of the men elected was high—educated, leading men in their communities. Most voters seemed 'agin the police' and to some extent 'agin the present assembly.'

To anyone who understands something of the background of Korea and is acquainted with the devil's brew of present conditions there, not only the success of the elections but also the work of the government during the less than two years of its existence seem almost miraculous.

The ingredients of this brew are many. Following 4,000 years of absolute monarchy and more than 40 years of Japanese oppression and indoctrination, the country experienced the catastrophe of division between Russia and the United States. The deluge of 5 million penniless, homeless refugees upon the 15 million people of South Korea; the lure of many millions of dollars worth of alien property dangled before people and officials; the existence of an actual state of war not only along the

border but throughout South Korea where Communist agents have infiltrated to commit murder, arson and all forms of sabotage; the desperate shortage of most commodities, ranging from petroleum to paper, from coal to clothing; the terrible sense of uncertainty as to whether the newly-born country would be thrown to the Communists or whether the United States would really assume some responsibility for it—all these create an almost impossible situation for both government and people.

Police Methods and Democracy

The South Korean police—so much criticized—were trained under the Japanese system, which is much that of any totalitarian state where police powers are almost unlimited and are so used. These methods were not entirely eradicated by the American police "instructors." To this should be added the usual provocative tactics of the Communists and the outrages that drive police and soldiers to "see red." It is not altogether surprising that the police have taken, used and abused privileges which are not in keeping with the civil liberties of a democratic regime. The stark fact of real, although undeclared, war explained much of the friction in South Korea. Yet the freedom with which the Assembly has attacked and criticized both the President and his cabinet, the degree of freedom which is still allowed the newspapers, and the freedom with which the elections have been conducted show that Korea is far from the "police state" which some claim it is, even admitting many serious mistakes and abuses.

In accordance with a decision reached by the Council of the Branches in 1948, the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN is issued bi-weekly during June, July and August. This decision was reached in order to meet increased printing costs without raising subscription rates.

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association

It was widely prophesied after the first elections that when the political parties had an opportunity to get organized and when the government once had a taste of power and a glimpse of the possibilities of using the police to keep itself in power, then Korean elections would be a tragicomic travesty of democratic procedures, with all the background effects of graft and oppression. The May election was therefore heartening to those who had clung to belief in the common sense, courage and adaptability of the Korean people.

What Korea needs now to continue on the path toward the necessarily slow de-

velopment of real democratic government is some assurance from the United States that all this is not wasted effort, that all who stand for and work for democratic principles will not be "purged" when, in the language of some American Senators, "we abandon Korea." Communist propaganda circulated in the south has prophesied this "abandonment" and has made specific and grim threats against those who continued to support the government of South Korea. To add verisimilitude, the persons and, worse, the families of prominent individuals have been frequently at-

tacked as a foretaste of what is to come.

The May elections will not usher in a golden era for the infant republic, nor will they bring any great or startling changes. They are, however, a step in the right direction and a demonstration that Korea is learning, and liking, democratic ways and that the common people can and will make themselves heard.

HORACE H. UNDERWOOD

Dr. Underwood, a missionary of the Presbyterian Board, served in 1945 as adviser to the United States Military Governor in Korea and later as adviser to the Korean director of the Department of Education.

Schuman Plan Raises Post-1952 Issues for U.S.

Exactly one month after the French government announced the Schuman plan, President Truman, making an important speech dealing with foreign economic policy, revealed a shift in Administration thinking that may have represented a response to the new situation created by that plan. Speaking at the commencement exercises of the University of Missouri on June 9, the President declared that "our vital national interest in a healthy world economy will not end in 1952," adding that American aid would continue after termination of the European Recovery Program. Since Secretary of State Dean Acheson said substantially the same thing several weeks earlier, this can be considered as official Administration policy.

Why the Change?

On the surface it may seem strange that the Schuman proposal, the most significant and far-reaching attempt yet made to build a revived and integrated European economy, was not greeted here as a justification for the diminution and subsequent cessation of American aid. At the outset the United States announced that Marshall Plan aid was being extended on a temporary basis and would end in 1952. Since then American foreign economic policy as expressed by the President, the Secretary of State and the Economic Cooperation Administrator continually emphasized the need for Europe to achieve—or come reasonably close to achieving—dollar viability before the ERP was concluded. Whether the point at issue was a European Payments Union, the relaxation of quantitative trade controls, the easing of exchange restrictions or the abolition of dual pricing, American spokesmen have urged European nations to develop, during

the limited period when American funds were available, economies that could exist without extraordinary foreign aid and without a host of protectionist and regulatory devices. Now, however, the situation has changed, and the Schuman proposal has become the nexus through which observers can trace and analyze the various threads of practice and policy as the post-1952 world pattern begins to emerge.

National Reactions

The French proposal involved a complex choice for all nations concerned. The week before the announcement, Paris was urging that the International Ruhr Authority be strengthened and that the annual limit on German steel production of 11.1 million tons be maintained. If the pool plan goes through, it will probably undermine the Ruhr Authority, and the present illegal rate of German steel production, 14.5 million tons per year, may be accepted if not increased. Only after protracted study—and rejection of alternatives—could France have decided to try this limited industrial merger with Germany.

The British position has been made clear by speeches in the House of Commons and the statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labor party of June 12. While London made many complex technical proposals and counterproposals in answer to Schuman's initial announcement, it is clear that the Labor party is not willing to sign a "blank check" that may involve accepting supranational decisions affecting the domestic structure of wages, prices and production. It seems that the Conservatives too have questions about Britain's role in the pool.

Germany's choice was the least com-

plex. The Bonn government had to consider that the combine might be dominated by the French, but that problem would confront them in any relationship. They realized that the plan would represent an important step forward in the German drive for political and economic influence. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer knew that American aid would not always be forthcoming to support the German economy. For Germany, then, an easing of the restrictions on its industrial output was almost inevitable.

Even the United States, although not directly involved as a participant, seems to have had some moments of doubt. After a brief silence, Washington expressed unqualified approval of the French initiative and hailed it as a constructive step towards European integration. Then Chancellor Adenauer said the plan would help transform a united Europe into a "third power," which would be neutral as between the United States and the Soviet bloc. It would, moreover, be so strong that it need not fear political and economic intercourse with both East and West.

This version of the pool posed a dilemma. The United States is committed to a strong Europe. Unlike the protagonists of the "third power" view, however, it is convinced that the conflict between East and West is more than one of rival "materialisms." It is an ideological dispute between Soviet totalitarianism and the free world. Washington fears that if Europe, under the guise of "neutrality," ventured to develop relations with the Soviet orbit, it would become another victim of Russian aggression.

Yet the realities of resource allocation leave no doubt that Western Europe and the United States do not form a viable

economy. The Steel Division of the Economic Commission for Europe predicts that by 1953 Europe will have a steel surplus of 8 million tons. If trade with Eastern Europe is deemed politically unwise, what will happen to this steel? Other manufactured commodities also will be in surplus, and if they cannot be sold, unemployment in Europe, now 4.65 million, will multiply. The only choice then is to continue to subsidize an artificially truncated world economy. Even this is not a simple matter. Protracted subsidies are neither feasible nor likely, from both the political and economic points of view. Nor is there assurance that any offer of continued American aid will counteract the "third power" idea. The uncertainties and abrupt changes in American policy, combined with the memory of the recent warnings about termination of our aid, are bound to worry Western Europeans.

Their post-war dependence on the United States has now largely disappeared. Men with firm and independent points of view are running Europe. The leaders of Britain have frequently moved slowly, if indeed at all, in response to prodding from Washington. The French, confident that the franc will soon be a hard currency, do their own thinking, as the Schuman proposal indicates; and their own position may be affected by the fall of the Bidault cabinet on June 24. Chancellor Adenauer is not only ready to defy the United States but also the wishes of his own people. When the results of the June 18 election in the Ruhr Valley area indicated popular support of a constitution which calls for socialization of industry, the Chancellor stated the next day that he did not expect the mandatory socialization provisions of the constitution to be implemented.

The Schuman proposal, although still in

the exploratory stages, has already accomplished something of great value. It has enabled many people to see more clearly the very real difficulties besetting the Western world in its struggle to achieve economic independence and strength. It has also focused attention on post-1952 problems in a forceful and dramatic way. The French plan will occupy a prominent place in the studies and reports now being prepared by government economists under the supervision of Mr. Gordon Gray. Mr. Gray's original assignment was to consider post-1952 trade relations in the absence of extraordinary American financial assistance. The implications and ramifications of the Schuman proposal have apparently brought about a change in emphasis and orientation of American foreign economic policy.

HOWARD C. GARY

Roosevelt's Wartime Policy Justified, Says Rauch

In the midst of the current confusion of thought and opinion regarding American foreign policy, it may be useful to attempt to clarify our premises. The most dangerous source of our confusion is not the type of eruption emanating from Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, serious as that is, but the lapse of some leaders of public opinion outside the government into tired and irresponsible neopacifism and neoisolationism. They contend that President Roosevelt's "mistakes" are to blame for the degeneration of the world situation, and they fall victims to the same erroneous ideas against which President Roosevelt fought for twelve years.

Peace or Collective Security?

The false premise from which most of our confusion stems is that the highest goal of United States foreign policy is, or should be, peace. The horrors of modern weapons are offered as reasons why peace should be elevated to a higher status among our objectives than it ever has been or can be by a nation which treasures freedom above all earthly values. Communists, isolationists and pacifists are united in their determination to hammer the concept of "peace above all" into Americans' minds, and each of these groups has its reason for doing so. Understanding the prior loyalty of Communists to the Soviet Union, of isolationists to unrestricted nationalism as the best guarantee of national security, and of paci-

fists to nonviolence, the American public could dismiss their arguments as a fringe affair were it not that so many of our public opinion leaders who do not represent such views nevertheless preach peace as our highest goal.

U.S. Policy Under Review

Current public discussion of American foreign policy has revealed great differences of opinion as to whether the United States committed errors in the past, and as to the course it should pursue in the future. The Foreign Policy Association has invited experts of differing points of view to present their conclusions on some of the major issues under discussion. The eighth and last of these articles appears in the adjoining columns.

All this is woefully familiar to anyone who recalls the years before Pearl Harbor when President Roosevelt was called a warmonger because he realized that the choice of the United States lay not between war and peace but between collective security, with its risk of war, and isolation, with its much graver risk of war and defeat. Today even Congress has come far enough to face up to the necessary premises of our foreign policy: that our highest goal is not peace but security for freedom; that the collective method of gathering the maximum number of allies

to face the minimum number of aggressors is the best available technique of achieving both security and peace; and that the risks of this policy—war, ideologically distasteful allies, loyalty purges—are less dangerous than the risks of the only alternative—isolation.

Years ago internationalists looked forward to the adoption by the United States of collective security as the end of the era of power politics and the dawn of a new era of world peace. Today they must face the grim fact that neither our foreign policy nor the United Nations can liquidate power politics or guarantee world peace; they can only strengthen the security of nonaggressive nations, peace or war.

Roosevelt's Objectives

President Roosevelt is accused of unwise "expediency" in moving for an "old-fashioned victor's peace" against the Axis. Some do not even give him credit for political expediency. They accuse him of having had no political war policy whatever, only the "naive" military one of defeating the Axis, with consequent "errors" in choice of fronts which should have been dictated by anticipation of trouble with Russia. The facts, however, indicate that Roosevelt did have a very definite and wise political goal in his conduct of the war. Like any statesman confronted by inexorable necessity to choose among alternatives, he chose to compromise sub-

ordinate goals for the sake of the primary goal: collective security. This goal required that a fair opportunity be given to all nations to join together against aggression after the war. Such an opportunity is absolutely necessary because free peoples will not fight unless their governments have completely satisfied them that the enemy has no excuse for aggression.

Roosevelt went to the limit, perhaps even beyond a reasonable limit, in compromising subordinate goals for the sake of the greater one. The "mistake" at Yalta proved that the United States policy did not refuse security for the Soviet Union. Exclusive military concentration on defeat of the Axis, as proved by the choice of fronts, besides saving us from the moral error of initiating overt disunity among the Allies and from the military folly of starting a third world war before the second one had ended, was also dictated by the political purpose of giving Russia no reason to reject a post-war policy of collective security.

It is an unavoidable weakness of a free and peaceful power that it must expose itself to betrayal by an aggressive dictatorship. But the latter type of government suffers from a more severe weakness: its acts of betrayal forewarn, forearm and consolidate the unity of its victims. This weakness defeated the Axis; now it may defeat Soviet aggression even without a war. It is by no means proved that the peoples of Russia and its satellites will be as eager to fight an aggressive war as were Germans, Italians and Japanese. The policy of Roosevelt and Truman has made a political record without which we cannot fight and one which gives maximum incentive to the Russian and satellite peoples to refuse to fight.

We must continue to carry out the policy of collective security on all levels: by supporting the UN as the forum where the Soviet government may at any time seek cooperation; by organizing outside the UN a maximum coalition of powers for all purposes which the Soviet government makes the UN helpless to achieve, including arming for collective defense and aiding economic prosperity, democracy and national independence of all peoples; and by a world-wide ideological offensive against the Soviet dictatorship. The

costs and dangers of this program are preferable to the costs and dangers of the only alternative—isolation, with or without appeasement of the Soviet Union.

If the demands of critics for "an affirmative policy toward peace" mean that the United States should initiate a top-level negotiation with the Soviet government, their demands should be rejected. Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam proved that the Soviet leaders wish by top-level, big-power negotiations to undercut the collective weight of the peaceful nations and win appeasement. The United States should accept a Soviet initiative towards negotiation only as a preliminary to a genuinely collective settlement.

President Roosevelt laid the ground for our present policy by quite properly exhausting the possibility that an easier one would serve. This program, strongly supported by our people, and the ending of confusion of counsel based on meaningless dichotomies between a peace program and a security program, between collective security and expedient power politics, between the "mistakes" of President Roosevelt and our present superior perspective, will give us our only actual chance for security in freedom, with peace if possible, through victory in war if necessary. If the Soviet leaders accept their own propaganda that our policy is imperialistic, the Russian and satellite peoples may nevertheless refuse to do so. Therein lies our final and, if we properly exploit it, excellent chance of success.

BASIL RAUCH

Mr. Rauch, Associate Professor of History, Barnard College, Columbia University, is author of *The History of the New Deal* (1944), *American Interest in Cuba* (1948), and *Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor* (1950).

Problems of European Union

How far have the European nations gone toward political, economic and military union? What are the obstacles today? the prospects for success tomorrow? For an up-to-the-minute, carefully documented study, READ:

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND
THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
by Jane Perry Clark Carey
June 15 issue
Foreign Policy Reports—25¢
Subscription \$5; to FPA members, \$4

FPA Bookshelf

Recent Books on U.S. Foreign Policy

John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, by Samuel Flagg Bemis. New York, Knopf, 1949. \$7.50.

The Sterling Professor of International History and inter-American Relations at Yale has written a combination biography of the eighth Secretary of State and the sixth President and history of United States foreign policy from Jay's Treaty to the Oregon Question. Adams was responsible for the formulation of many contemporary principles in American foreign policy, including equality of commercial opportunity.

War or Peace, by John Foster Dulles. New York, Macmillan, 1950. \$1.00, paper edition.

The special adviser to the Secretary of State concludes that the balance of world power has been shifting to the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. Terming the situation of the non-Communist nations "precarious," he recommends that we put foreign policy bipartisanship on a "solid basis," revitalize the United Nations, promote European integration and clarify policy in Asia. Mr. Dulles says military influence is too strong in United States foreign policy.

The American People and Foreign Policy, by Gabriel A. Almond. New York, Harcourt, 1950. \$3.75.

The relationship between public opinion and foreign policy—one of the most critical components of the American position in a time of world crisis—is penetratingly analyzed by a social scientist on the staff of the Yale Institute of International Studies. Dr. Almond examines the American character, depicting its instability as reflected in fluctuating foreign policy moods, and describes the foreign policy consensus, various deviations from this norm and the role of opinion elites.

Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. X, January 1-December 31, 1948, edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner. Published for the World Peace Foundation by the Princeton University Press, 1950. \$6.00.

The tenth volume in this invaluable compilation of source materials brings together the record of American policy during the Berlin blockade, the presidential election campaign, the inauguration of the European Recovery Program, the creation of Western Hemisphere defense machinery and numerous other developments in economic, security, political and social policy.

Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore. Boston, Little, 1950. \$3.50.

The fruit of intensive research and collaboration by members of the Inner Asian Seminar at Johns Hopkins University, this study presents a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of Sinkiang—historical, geographic and ethnic, social and political. In this area, little known to the West, opposed forces emanating from China, Russia, Iran and India have converged for centuries.

The Price of Union, by Herbert Agar. Boston, Houghton, 1950. \$5.00.

A history of the American federal and party system pointing out the strains and stresses to which it has been subject but emphasizing the deep needs it has met and its basic strength. The author is a well-known journalist, historian, lecturer and Pulitzer Prize winner.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIX, No. 36, JUNE 30, 1950. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMENY, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; WILLIAM W. WADE, Associate Editor. Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.